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SO: Lord Hurd, I wondered if you might begin, please, with your 
recollections of the Commonwealth during your time at the United 
Nations in 1956. This was of course the time of the Suez Crisis and I 
know that within the ‘old Commonwealth’, opinion towards British 
action in Suez was enormously divided.  
 
DH: Yes. At New York there were regular Commonwealth meetings; I think they 
were useful in the sense that people turned up, or sent somebody to 
represent them, but they weren’t thought to be hugely decisive in character. 
And the big issue, the drama, in my first year or so, was of course Suez. On 
Suez. the Australians and the New Zealanders were prepared to support us - 
they were still firmly attached to the British tradition and they thought therefore 
that it was their national duty to support the British enterprise. I vividly 
remember that support and the rather impatient way in which it was delivered.  
I mean, they wanted us to get on with it. But the rest of the Commonwealth 
was either ambiguous, like Canada, or hostile like Krishna Menon of India. 
Some of the most savage attacks on us were delivered by Krishna because 
he knew the British system and he could always quote somebody against us; 
he had no compunction about doing that, and there was no sense of solidarity 
as far as I could see. I do remember that all quite vividly, not because the 
Commonwealth as such, played a big part, although Canada and Lester 
Pearson did actually play a large part in originating the idea of a supervised 
withdrawal, and that proved a crucial element in the outcome. So Canada was 
the most influential of the Commonwealth countries at that time in that issue, 
precisely because its attitude was somewhat ambiguous. It was acceptable to 
all sides as an intermediary and they did a good deal of it that way. 
 
SO: Sir, how far would you say that by the time you joined the Foreign 
Affairs Section of the Conservative Research Department in 1966 that 
Canada remained the leading voice within the Commonwealth? 
 
DH: I don’t know really whether that is true. I think the speed with which that 
particular beast has now run down hill and fallen down hill is quite marked. 
Canadians now I don’t think would claim any particular resonance in the 
Commonwealth, but they certainly did all through the Lester Pearson years, 
and even with Diefenbaker and so on. They still had a quite a strong voice. 
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SO: And of course Arnold Smith, the first Secretary General, was himself a 
long-standing Canadian diplomat. 
 
DH: Yes, yes, yes. 
 
SO: The Commonwealth itself had gone through an extraordinary 
metamorphosis by 1966, with the emergence of the Afro-Asia contingent 
that joined the Commonwealth post-independence, and with the 
creation of the Secretariat, of course, in ’65. How clear are your 
recollections of the crisis of Rhodesian UDI  for the Commonwealth, and 
for Britain? Did that form a large part of your work at the CRD? 
 
DH: No, it didn’t, it didn’t – at that time it didn’t, we are talking about the late 50’s, I 
left New York in 1960, and Rhodesia was not really an issue. I mean, it 
hovered in the background but it wasn’t a crucial issue which was debated in 
public. 
 
SO: But by 1966, when you had joined the Foreign Affairs Section at the 
CRD, had it become more important? 
 
DH: Yes, I don’t think that we were particularly influential at that – I don’t think they 
were seminal years in my life. But of course as advisor to Ted Heath, one got 
involved mainly in issues of how the Opposition should vote. And of course 
the Conservative Party split three ways in December 1965 in the famous vote. 
So it was very difficult for Ted as a newly arrived Leader to navigate, to know 
quite how to do that.  But I wasn’t really involved in that. 
 
SO: Do you recall what Ted Heath’s views were on the Commonwealth? He 
has been described very much as a ‘Europe’ man, leading Britain into 
the European Economic Community in 1973. Where do you feel the 
Commonwealth sat in his rank of priorities? 
 
DH: I think the answer is ‘Not very high’. I went with him to the Singapore Heads of 
Government conference. Out of that came, if I am right in remembering, a 
statement in principle which was negotiated and in a way punctured the crisis 
which had arisen from the British commitment to sell arms to South Africa. But 
it was defused in the way these things sometimes happen - by the skilful 
drafting of the statement which was issued at the end of the conference. I 
describe in my book (Douglas Hurd: Memoirs (Little, Brown 2003), the skilful 
way in which old hands set themselves to drafting that document. 
 
SO: Yes, indeed. Did Alec Douglas-Home accompany Ted Heath on that 
particular trip? I know it was for heads of Government and so Foreign 
Secretaries wouldn’t necessarily have gone along at that particular 
point. 
 
DH: I don’t know the answer to that. Home was certainly very active, but whether 
he was active from afar? I don’t think he was there. I am thinking of the 
Commonwealth dinner party on board the Destroyer, which Ted hosted. In 
theory, it celebrated the new South East Asia Security Arrangement which 
had been negotiated, but I don’t think Sir Alex was there. I don’t think he was 
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there, I think that I would remember it if he was actually there. I think he was 
minding the shop, as far as I remember. 
 
SO: How important would you say is this question of hospitality around the 
edges of summits? Do you think in fact it is a necessary distraction 
from the intensity of debate or disagreement? 
 
DH: No, I don’t think it is that. My general feeling about the Commonwealth is that 
it is a great big meeting place. It is a sort of fair: a medieval fair, and you 
wander round and you visit one booth and then another, and all the time you 
are actually meeting, you are learning, you are absorbing other people’s 
ideas, but you are not in a forum where you immediately have to respond. 
The Commonwealth, like the UN, but in a more intimate and jokey way, 
provides such a useful forum. 
 
SO: Coming on to the modern Commonwealth, are there now too many 
summits? After all, Britain belongs to a considerable number of summit-
holding clubs? 
 
DH: Yes, I think in general there are too many summits, but I wouldn’t think the 
Commonwealth summit was the worst offender, what is the villain of chalk 
ups? I don’t think every two years is excessive. I think the usefulness of the 
Commonwealth CHOGM as a forum where people get to know each other, 
get to understand each other is, if anything, somewhat increased with the 
years. To go back: I think the concept of the Commonwealth which you still 
come across is this concept in people’s speeches as a force for united good 
in the world. It’s not. I think that hope was destroyed between the Wars really, 
when Australia and Canada in particular made clear that they were involved in 
their own policy making and that it wasn’t to be assumed that they would 
automatically follow us. They did follow us in the Second World War, but that 
in a way is rather a remarkable fact and in South Africa followed us in the 
War. 
 
SO: But only after a great deal of debate? 
 
DH: After a great deal of debate, which just shows that this was no longer a given, 
no longer an assumed fact; it was something that was pushed through. But 
anyway, the point I am making there was that scene at Chanak in 1922, when 
Lloyd-George wanted to support the Greeks and to use the Commonwealth; 
he was checked in his efforts to mobilize the Commonwealth, in an anti-
Turkish action on the side of the Greeks. The Commonwealth just signalled 
that it wasn’t available to be the Lieutenant for British foreign policy. And I 
think, at that time there died the idea which had ran through Joe 
Chamberlain’s thinking and so on, that the Commonwealth was going to be a 
united force in support of whatever happened to be the British Policy of the 
day. One still comes across that idea, but it is more or less dead. And the 
Commonwealth has developed uncertainly and not in a clear and positive 
direction; but it has developed its own ideas and its own thinking. 
 
SO: Very much so. You attended the Harare CHOGM, in 1991, with Prime 
Minister John Major.  
 
DH: Yes, yes. 
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SO: So the Commonwealth was obviously, to use your wording, a “very 
different beast” from the old Commonwealth, the original old Dominions 
small club. 
 
DH: Absolutely, absolutely. Yes. And to answer your question about Ted, I think 
he was as it were, un-amused by that. His experience of the Commonwealth 
when he was negotiating on Europe was when he, or rather ministers other 
than himself, did a great tour of the Commonwealth and reported to the 
Cabinet on Commonwealth views and those views were, on the whole 
reasonably favourable for British entry. They said they understood the political 
arguments; they each had their own economic interests to protect but as long 
as Ted Heath did a good job, as far as their economic interests were 
concerned, they were not going to raise a general cry against British entry into 
the EEC. And they didn’t. I mean there was no sustained argument across the 
Commonwealth, and the ministers reporting to the Cabinet on that tour that 
they had made, reported really the mood was one of sadness but accepting 
that life had moved on; and that the arguments that the British were putting 
were quite strong. But of course we had New Zealand butter and we had the 
other issues, we had Caribbean Sugar; these specific, national interests 
which we wanted to see protected. 
 
SO: Moving on again 20 years, Sir, then to your time as Foreign Secretary: 
what were the attitudes towards the Commonwealth within the broader 
Conservative Party at that particular time? 
 
DH: I think there was a group within the Party which was resolutely pro-
Commonwealth, but it was quite a small group. What has happened now is 
that Group has expanded and we hear much more about the Commonwealth 
than we did. My own view is that this is not a permanent shift, and it will be a 
mistake to build too much in to it. Because the old arguments about Europe 
have not died, they are just dormant, going through their normal phase of 
mixed enthusiasm and distain. I think one sees this quite clearly now. There is 
a temporary revived enthusiasm for the Commonwealth, simply because it is 
not Europe; but I don’t, myself, think over 20 or 30 years that is a sustainable 
feature. 
 
SO: If that was the attitude within the broader Conservative party in the 
1990’s and early, 2000’s, at the time how far did you see a purpose and 
utility of the Commonwealth for British foreign policy? Or were you just 
simply bombarded by ‘Events, dear boy. Events’ in the 90’s, so the 
Commonwealth had to be lower down the list of priorities? 
 
DH: I think to some extent the second thing is true. I don’t think the years that I 
was at Number 10 were in any sense “Commonwealth Years”. We had to 
navigate through the row in ‘71, but it was not – 
 
SO: Well of course there was the issue of South Africa for British politics, 
and Mrs Thatcher’s particular presentation of British policy in the 
1980’s. But by the time you came to be Foreign Secretary and John 
Major, of course, was the new Conservative Prime Minister, was the 
Commonwealth of lesser importance? Simply because it was changing 
yet again? 
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DH: It was always there, and every now and then it came to life; under successive 
Secretaries General, it twitched, as it were. 
 
SO: I was just thinking of popular British attitudes towards the Church of 
England: “it’s always there!” 
 
DH: Yes, well and it is as it were, a comforting thought. I mean, it is an institution 
which has just survived. “What did you do during the French Revolution?” “J’ai 
vecu!” “I survived!” And that is what is true of the Commonwealth. It is still 
alive and twitching. Twitching occasionally – well, twitching is too funereal a 
word. It is there, and every now and then British Ministers use it as we did 
when we were joining Europe, we used the Commonwealth as an instrument 
of diplomacy, as a method of diplomacy. We needed to know what the 
attitudes were; we had our view, we put our view, and broadly speaking the 
Commonwealth went along with that. So whereas we might have expected a 
great sort of commotion from people like Bob Menzies and so on, in fact that 
didn’t happen. So that was an example of the British using the 
Commonwealth, perfectly legitimately, as a vehicle for their own ideas. 
 
SO: Were you also using it as a particular vehicle for your own ideas 
towards South Africa and Mozambique in the early ‘90’s. I know that you 
didn’t go to the retreat at the 1991 Harare CHOGM because you made a 
trip to Mozambique and there was a discussion about Commonwealth 
Membership and whether Mozambique should come in. Journalists were 
reporting at the time that Britain wasn’t ultra-keen on including 
Mozambique. 
 
DH: Well, I can imagine there was a sort of feeling, “what the hell is this about?” 
There was no particular link with Britain; one of the tests of the 
Commonwealth is really in practice that there has been a link, that there is a 
past link with Britain. You could stretch a point as regards to Cameroon 
because they had been party to a British Mandate –  
 
SO: But only 20% of the population of modern Cameroon speak English? 
 
DH: Yes, well that… No, I don’t remember that. I don’t remember honestly a 
Mozambique question, but I am perfectly prepared to agree with whatever the 
papers say. 
 
SO: Perhaps it was more contentious for Mozambique than it was for Britain 
within the Commonwealth?  
 
DH: Yes. 
 
SO: I was struck by John Major’s reflections in his autobiography that 
“Crisis and ruptures and arguments at CHOGMs seem to require a lot of 
hot air and most of the discussion is really for domestic consumption”. 
Yet once you have had the big bust up at CHOGM, everything settles 
down again. 
 
DH: Yes, yes, I think that is true. 
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SO: As far as Britain’s policy towards South Africa was concerned, in the 
90’s: Mandela was released in February 1990, but the path between the 
release of Mandela and the process of transition with the National Party 
and negotiations with De Klerk was by no means a done deal. Those 
were four very, very fraught years. 
 
DH: Absolutely. I don’t really remember how many times I went to South Africa 
quite quietly. I remember once Simon Jenkins when he was the Editor of the 
Times rebuked me in his Leaders for ‘messing about in South Africa,’ and I 
rang him up and said “look, we have been asked. The parties to these 
discussions are keen that we should get involved”, and this was both true of 
Mandela and of De Klerk and so I am going simply in order to facilitate the 
process; and if you are in favour of the process, you can’t really be against my 
facilitating it.” And he accepted that with a grumble or two, but that was the 
position. I literally can’t remember how many times I went there, but I was 
facilitating because several times the discussions between these two, De 
Klerk and Mandela, hovered on the brink of collapse, as you say, and we had 
a role. It wasn’t an open role and it was partly a matter of who you could get 
under a British roof in Pretoria or Cape Town. They would come to an 
invitation from the British High Commissioner which they wouldn’t have come 
if he hadn’t had that unique position. Both Tony Reeve and Robin Renwick 
had a listening role but a listening role which sometimes resulted in, it might 
be a message from the Prime Minister, or it might be a visit from me; we were 
active. I was conscious all the time that we were getting stick in the 
Commonwealth because of our attitude and the sanctions, but I knew also 
what they didn’t know that actually Margaret was really strongly against 
Apartheid and thought it was doomed; she was therefore urging that Mandela 
should be released, although very much against sanctions and the idea of 
South Africa being coerced. She was in effect saying to PW Botha, “Look, you 
are on to a loser”. 
 
SO: I’ve seen her bombardment of letters to PW Botha on the Margaret 
Thatcher Foundation website: Pik Botha told me that he drafted replies 
for PW Botha, as his English wasn’t good enough. It comes through 
very powerfully in her correspondence - her loathing of Apartheid but 
constant urging for reform. 
 
DH: Yes, well if you could bring that out a little bit in these interviews. I mean it is 
simply not understood. 
 
SO: When I talked to him, Pik Botha was quite emphatic that if it hadn’t been 
for Margaret Thatcher, the Eminent Persons Groups in 86 ‘would not 
have got through the door’; that consistently he was arguing with PW, 
“We must not humiliate this lady; we have got to give her something”. 
 
DH: Really, is that right? 
 
SO: Yes. His line was, ‘She is a true friend of South Africa. She is an 
opponent of Apartheid, but she is a friend of South Africa.’ 
 
DH: That is exactly what I am saying, and I knew that. I mean, as her Foreign 
Secretary, I knew that, and it was continued under John Major, but of course 
the world didn’t understand that. They thought she was simply an ally of 
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South Africa, and in a way that gave her a sort of standing which she wouldn’t 
otherwise have had; she was the only person in the world really who was on 
friendly terms with De Klerk, and she could use that. But on the whole, she 
was using it all the time to say, “Look you have got to move. You have got to. 
This idea is not a good idea, you must let this man out.” 
 
SO: As far as the Commonwealth is concerned, though, do you think on the 
South Africa issue that, as Percy Cradock put it, “she assumed the role 
of the villain with relish, perhaps too much relish”? 
 
DH: Yes, well exactly! I think that is absolutely true. She did. She didn’t mind 
being, as it were, attacked by people who in her eyes were not qualified to 
attack her. She wasn’t like John Major who was always leaping to get the first 
edition of every newspaper. She wasn’t press conscious and, if people 
thought about that they wouldn’t like that, but she didn’t have to take any 
notice. She had a quite a robust attitude. I think Cranley [Onslow] probably 
supported her in that, I think he had rather similar views himself. 
 
SO: Yes, he did. I remember him taking me aside once, when he was Minister 
of State at the Foreign Office in 1982-83, and saying “Sue, Winnie 
Mandela is not a nice lady”. That was in the early 80’s when, of course, 
Winnie Mandela was the icon of the liberation struggle to the outside 
world. I’m not in any way minimising how appalling it was for her to be 
constantly harassed by the South African authorities when her husband 
was in jail, nor how lonely it was bringing up her children entirely by 
herself. But that quiet word from Dad was very powerful, implying he 
had read very different reports of the brutality around her ‘Football 
team’ in Soweto. 
 
DH: When I and Prince Philip and the Archbishop of Canterbury - not necessarily 
in that order! - went to the Transfer of Power, it was really one of the most 
satisfactory moments of my career. It really was. We had an amazing time, 
and spent a good deal of time drinking, what’s that South African Beer? 
[Castle Beer?] I remember the beer. The Duke of Edinburgh wanted beer, and 
there was a particular kind of beer, and I was sent to go and get it, or one of 
my private secretaries was sent to go and get it. There was a marvellous 
picture taken, I don’t think it survived, of the Archbishop and the Duke and 
whoever the High Commissioner was, all swigging beer behind this soft 
curtain; it was a thirsty day! But it was very, very moving when the fighter jets 
came overhead and Mandela said, “Now you cheer, these are your fighters 
now”. ‘‘These are our planes, fighter planes’’, and then when he made them 
sing both National Anthems. It was an extraordinary episode. 
 
SO: How far, in addition to your facilitating role, had Britain also given 
assistance with training of the police, helped with the transition of 
defence forces, drawing on the British experience in Zimbabwe? 
 
DH: Well, quite a big contribution. I can’t remember the details at all, but I do 
remember this was quite an important issue. I think we played quite a 
substantial part. But I can’t remember the details. 
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SO: By 1994, with South Africa’s transition to black majority rule, you were 
emphasising very much the bi-lateral relationship of Britain/South 
Africa, and rather than Britain within the Commonwealth? 
 
DH: Yes, I guess so.  
 
SO: So, was the Commonwealth, in your view, sliding down the list of British 
priorities? After all, this is also the time of the debate about winding up 
funding for the Commonwealth Institute in London, the discussion 
about funding toward the Commonwealth Secretariat, and its 
Developmental Fund. Was there a fundamental adjustment of priorities, 
in terms of the Commonwealth? 
 
DH: Well, It’s a good point, I think, the Commonwealth was institutionally 
expanding. But I think that is a different point from its real influence. I think it is 
perfectly possible to expand institutionally - I mean, we see this with the EU 
now. You take in new members, and you think that is fine; but actually all the 
time your real influence in declining. And I think probably you multiply the 
institutions and you produce new declarations and so on and so on, but these 
are not really a sign of vitality. You can be having a withering away process at 
the same time. 
 
SO: So people could be bound up in process, driven by a liberal 
internationalist agenda, but this was dramatically different to realist 
pragmatic politics that addresses results? 
 
DH: Yes, there is a gap. Yes, absolutely. 
 
SO: I appreciate how busy you were as Foreign Secretary in the 1990’s with 
the Reunification of Germany, the First Gulf War, the war in former 
Yugoslavia. Did you have active contact as Foreign Secretary with the 
Commonwealth Secretary General Chief Emeka Anyaoku, or was that 
something that operated lower down within the Foreign Office? 
 
DH: I had a relationship [with Chief Emeka]. I saw him, but quite often I saw him 
socially because he was a sociable sort of person. It wouldn’t have occurred 
to me in, let’s say, the correspondence of the Government of South Africa to 
use him as the channel. He wasn’t the channel. I was in direct touch, I was in 
touch directly with Pik Botha and so I didn’t need the Commonwealth to act as 
an Intermediary. Was it actually active during that time? 
 
SO: Well, the Secretariat likes to think so! 
 
DH: Yes, well exactly. 
 
SO: As far as Chief Emeka is concerned, that decade was part of his re-
organisation and regeneration of the Commonwealth, to emphasis its 
role as a values organisation with the Harare Declaration of 1991, 
underpinning democracy and human rights. When I made reference, 
before I started recording, to your speech at the English Speaking 
Union, you had spelled out your attitude of the Commonwealth playing 
an inter-governmental supporting role to the necessary business of 
foreign policy of Governments, whereas Emeka seemed to have an idea 
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of its global humanitarian agenda, supporting election monitoring, 
emphasising increasingly debt forgiveness, and environmental issues. 
 
DH: Yes. Well, it is a difference of viewpoint. I mean, it depends upon the angle 
from which you are speaking; if you are speaking as the Chief of the 
organisation, obviously you try and exhort its importance and there is nothing 
wrong with that; but you are actually only one, and not necessarily the most 
important, of a series of players. Sonny Ramphal, I think it was before my 
time, but he boasted too much. 
 
SO: He was in his last year as Secretary General, when you became Foreign 
Secretary. Chief Emeka became Secretary General in 1990… 
 
DH: But Ramphal was what I would call, in the nicest possible way, ‘a loud mouth’. 
He talked a lot. He blew his own trumpet anywhere he could and in a way I 
think that reduced the total of good that he did. But he was succeeded by 
people who were not loud mouths and they were people who you could take 
aside and talk to with confidence and so on, and they would respect that. A lot 
depended on the identity of the Secretary General. 
 
SO: The last Commonwealth crisis, during your time as Foreign Secretary, in 
the build-up to Auckland CHOGM in 1995 was of course Nigeria, and the 
arrest of and approaching execution of Ken Sara Wiwa, and the eight 
members of MOSOP of the Ogoni People. There was also the issue of 
France’s nuclear testing in the Pacific which Australia and New Zealand 
were taking such exception to, because they wanted to see a Nuclear 
Free Pacific. I appreciate that you had stepped down as Foreign 
Secretary by the time of the Auckland meeting, but do you have any 
recollection of how important these Commonwealth tensions were, 
again, in the list of priorities? 
 
DH: I don’t really; it doesn’t swim into the middle of my consciousness really. I was 
aware of the issues, but I don’t think I really regarded them as central. They 
were irritants, they were problems that needed to be solved, or at least 
smoothed over. Rather than actually being decisive. 
 
SO: Thank you, Sir, your pause there just underlines that perspective is 
everything. So that to the British High Commissioner down in Australia 
it may have seemed a huge thing because there was a bust up between 
Paul Keating and John Major in the approach to the Auckland CHOGM; 
but from your standpoint in King Charles Street, actually there were 
other things that were pre-occupying you. 
 
DH: Absolutely, absolutely. 
 
SO: Sir, just in conclusion: is it fair to say that John Major was, when Prime 
Minister, ‘a man of the Commonwealth’? That he emphasised the 
Commonwealth much more, to differentiate himself from Mrs Thatcher? 
 
DH: I don’t think it was a deliberate differentiation. You know, he is by nature a 
more congenial fellow. He goes into a room and his instinct is to go round and 
shake everybody warmly by the hand and say he is very glad to see them. 
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SO: A consummate politician! 
 
DH: Well exactly, but he regards that as a crucial part of politics and he is right. 
Whereas she waited, and she was always looking for something to disagree 
with, who knows! And she usually found it. 
 
SO: Is that perhaps why she was brusque with her relations with Geoffrey 
Howe - because he wouldn’t disagree with her, because he was innately 
too courteous and polite? 
 
DH: Exactly, it was greatly mishandled on both sides. But that is right. It is partly a 
matter of characteristics. John Major is a man who is searching for the best, 
whoever he is dealing with. Searching for points of agreement and that was 
not her style. She wanted to identify and deal with the points of disagreement. 
 
SO: So, for instance, John Major’s announcement at Harare that Britain was 
prepared unilaterally to reschedule debt; his emphasis on money 
laundering and the need to address that - these were, in part, the 
reflection of John Major the politician, emphasising points of 
consensus? 
 
DH: Yes, exactly, I think that is exactly right. 
 
SO:  Just in conclusion, how and why do you think the Commonwealth 
survived? 
 
DH: I think it is probably past the danger point. I think it is settling into the 
international world as a useful, but not essential component, and every now 
and then it can be useful. It is not going to be a threat to anybody I don’t think, 
now. The idea of the Commonwealth as a threat which came in the days of 
the rows over South Africa? No one is going to say that now, and I think that, I 
don’t think it will be exalted into being an essential component, an essential 
instrument, in making British foreign policy. But I think it is there, it is useful, it 
is a tool, it is worth keeping it, and keeping in reasonably good shape. 
Keeping it serviced, as it were. 
 
SO: How much do you think that the particular persona and authority of 
office of the Queen has been an integral part of the survival of the 
Commonwealth? 
 
DH: Well, every now and then, if you are travelling with the Queen, you are 
brought up against the somewhat surprising fact that she is the Queen of 
several other realms and they are very much in her mind. And therefore in the 
minds of the Courtiers, or the Court, and this always comes as a surprise. 
You find yourself discussing, or somebody is discussing the constitution of 
Fiji, and you suddenly realise that you are in the presence of the Monarch, 
and she is very well aware of that. So her personal influence has been 
substantial; this is partly a matter of hospitality, and partly a matter of her 
general reputation as having made in Pretoria, on her 21st birthday, that 
Broadcast dedicating herself to the welfare of the Commonwealth. So that is a 
partly personal thing which won’t necessarily be inherited, but the Prince of 
Wales, I think, equally, though in a different term of office, is equally 
enthusiastic. So the Queen’s presence is an important part of the 
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Commonwealth, an important part of the Commonwealth’s appeal, particularly 
now when the Queen as it were, rides very high, and for the fact that she is 
devoted to the Commonwealth and spends a lot of time on Commonwealth 
matters and visits she carries people with her. There must be something in 
this Commonwealth because the Queen is so keen on it, and I think at the 
moment that is quite a factor. 
 
SO: Sir, thank you very much indeed.  
 
[END OF AUDIOFILE] 
